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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH ANALYSIS AND THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
Everyday, Americans are caught between combatants on the
frontlines of the advertising wars. From recent pizza and beer wars, to
burger and cola wars, to sneaker wars, to credit card wars, to cold cereal
wars, to blistering long distance carrier wars, American consumers are
continuously bombarded with comparative advertising.' In U.S. Health-
care, Inc. v. Blue Cross,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit addressed the complaints of two health insurance giants engaged
in comparative advertising.3 Each party claimed that the other party's
1. Comparative advertising involves copy that compares the marketed
product with its competitors' products. See Lewis, Choose your Weapons: The Four
Faces of Comparatives; Comparison Advertising, 53 DIRECT MARKETING MAG., No. 1, at
34 (1990). Described as a "formidable weapon" and an "exquisite rapier" in the
advertising world, marketers use the comparative tool not only to extol the vir-
tues of their own products but also to reveal the handicaps of their competitors'
products. Id.; see also Garfield, Good Taste Takes Deep Dive in Bungee Ad for Reebok
Pump, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 26, 1990, at 52 (criticizing Reebok's comparative
ad where bungee jumper dives to his death off bridge because of inferior fit of
his Nike sneaker while Reebok jumper survives); Hume, Mac Chief Explodes 'Bur-
ger Wars'Competition to Get Fiercer, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 14, 1986, at 3 (compar-
ative advertising expected to increase in fast food industry as supply outpaces
demand); Liesse & Dagnoli, Kellogg's Golden Era Flakes Away, ADVERTISING AGE,
Aug. 13, 1990, at 4 (Kellogg's, reacting to its decreasing market share, launched
its first comparative ad campaign pitting its "Just Right" cereal against General
Mills' "Total"); Teinowitz, Coors Extra Gold Tests Bud's Taste, ADVERTISING AGE,
Dec. 17, 1990, at 35 (Coors used comparative ad form to claim that Coors Extra
Gold was preferred over Budweiser in taste test); Pizza Hut's Commercial Falls Flat
with Domino's, Marketing. The Ad Wars that Inflamed the Cola and Burger Businesses
Have Come to Pizza, L.A. Times,Jan. 11, 1991, at D 11, col. 1 (Pizza Hut's delivery
service advertisements attack Domino's employees and franchises as well as its
product); Foltz, U.S. Sprint in Rebuttal to A. T. &T., N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at
D13, col. 3 (U.S. Sprint replied to A.T.&T.'s "Put it in writing" campaign with:
"We will put it in writing, A.T.&T., lighten up."); Horovitz, Competitors Come Out
Swinging in New Ads, L.A. Times, July 21, 1987, § 4, at 9, col. 1 ("[M]akers of
everything from automobiles to analgesics are having at each other-by name";
discusses Visa's "Disadvantages of Membership" attack of American Express);
Snyder, Cola War Summer Offensive Starts with Taste-Test Attack, Crain's Chicago
Bus.,June 15, 1987, at 8 ("This year's battle between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola
has both sides mobilizing for extensive taste-testing campaigns.").
2. 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990).
3. Most of the advertising at issue in U.S. Healthcare was comparative. See id.
at 927. For a detailed description of the advertisements at issue in U.S. Health-
care, see infra notes 14-15.
(947)
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advertisements violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 4 as well as the
Pennsylvania laws prohibiting defamation, commercial disparagement
and tortious interference with contract.
5
Significantly, the U.S. Healthcare court held that the high level of
protection usually afforded to free speech as formulated in New York
Times v. Sullivan6 does not apply to corporate parties where the speech
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part,
that
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such per-
son with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
The district court used the 1982 version of the Lanham Act when it adjudi-
cated the claim. The Third Circuit, however, found that it was appropriate to
apply the Act's 1988 amendments retroactively, noting that an appellate court
"must 'apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so
would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative
history to the contrary.' " U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 922 n.9 (quoting Bradley
v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
The Lanham Act's 1988 amendments included a change in the law that was
relevant to the instant case. A description of the misrepresented products was
added. Included in this description were statements made concerning "his or
her or another person's products." Id. at 921 (emphasis in opinion). The Third
Circuit noted that "the legislative history, which states that the amendment is
intended 'to make clear that misrepresentations about another's products are as
actionable as misrepresentations about one's own,' would appear to support the
retroactive application of the new provision." Id. at 922 n.9 (quoting S. REP.
No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5577, 5603). Media coverage surrounding the passage of the amendment
indicated that it "[r]eflect[ed] the growth in comparative advertising ...[by]
expand[ing] the right of a business to sue competitors that attack it in advertise-
ments." Andrews, Trademark Bill Passed By House, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1988, at
D1, col. 6.
5. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 917. For a discussion of the elements of defa-
mation, commercial disparagement and tortious interference with contract ac-
tions, see infra note 25.
6. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). New York Times is the landmark decision
that linked first amendment free speech protections to defamation actions. Id.
In New York Times, a Montgomery, Alabama public official claimed that insinua-
tions in a New York Times advertisement that advocated equal rights for blacks
in the South were libelous. Id. at 256. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed the verdict in favor of the official and held that "the Constitution delimits
a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials
2
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they seek to protect is advertising. 7 Because the Third Circuit character-
ized the comparative advertisements in question as "commercial
speech," the court concluded that the New York Times actual malice stan-
dard was inappropriate. 8 In its analysis, the court enunciated guidelines
to be used in determining whether the New York Times standard is re-
quired in the corporate context.9 These guidelines mandate an evalua-
tion of the status of the parties and the character of the speech at
issue. l0
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The legal claims at issue in U.S. Healthcare arose from advertising
campaigns of Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Blue
Shield (Blue Cross) and U.S. Healthcare, Inc. during 1986-87.11 In
against critics of their official conduct .... [In] such . . .action[s], the rule re-
quiring proof of actual malice is applicable." Id. at 283.
The Court opined that heightened Constitutional scrutiny was mandated
because public debate regarding public officials in their official capacity should
be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." Id. at 270. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, discussed the po-
tential chill on free speech were the standard not heightened for comment on
the activities of public officials: "[Tihe pall of fear and timidity [of virtually un-
limited damage judgments] imposed upon those who would give voice to public
criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot sur-
vive." Id. at 278. The Court found that in order to ensure the survival of first
amendment protections, it was crucial that public speech be protected to a de-
gree greater than all other speech: "[An] erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate, and . . .it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . .to survive .... . Id. at 271-72
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
7. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939.
8. Id. at 933-37. Because the Third Circuit determined that the speech in
U.S. Health Care was commercial and therefore, chill-resistant, the New York Times
standard was not necessary to give "adequate breathing space" to the freedoms
protected by the first amendment.
The Third Circuit found for U.S. Healthcare who claimed that the speech at
issue was commercial: "U.S. Healthcare maintains that the New York Times stan-
dard is 'not mandated where, as here, false commercial speech is at issue.' " Id.
at 927. On the other hand, in granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict filed by Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Blue
Shield (Blue Cross), the district court had applied a heightened level of constitu-
tional protection. Id. at 920. The district court had held that where the subject
matter of the speech at issue was of public concern and the subject of the speech
was a public figure, as was the situation in U.S. Healthcare, the speech rises above
the commercial level, and the additional protections afforded first amendment
speech are applicable. Id. For a discussion of commercial speech and its rela-
tionship with the first amendment, see infra notes 32, 38-43 & 48-50. For a
discussion of the development of the New York Times rationale, see infra notes 31
& 45.
9. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 927-39. For a discussion of the Third Cir-
cuit's guidelines, see infra notes 55 & 57 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 927-39.
11. Id. at 918-20. It is important to emphasize the increasing competition
3
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1986, Blue Cross introduced "Personal Choice," a Preferred Provider
Organization (PPO) 12 that was designed to compete with U.S. Health-
that exists between traditional and non-traditional insurance plans, such as the
parties in the case at bar. Blue Cross/Blue Shield (Blues) plans, along with pri-
vate insurance, have dominated American health care financing since the 1950s
when third party payers became prevalent. G. ANNAS, S. LAW, R. ROSENBLATr &
K. WING, AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 19-20 (1990) [hereinafter AMERICAN HEALTH
LAW]. Traditional insurance plans such as Blue Cross operate by charging a
premium to the insured and reimbursing the hospital on a fee for service basis
for services that are covered. Id. at 214. Services covered in traditional Blue
Cross plans are ordinarily characterized as hospital and medical/surgical cover-
age, or those services required only when the insured is seriously ill. Blue
Shield, the physician office services arm of Blue Cross, reimburses the insured
on an indemnity basis for covered services. Id. at 20.
U.S. Healthcare represents another type of health care third party payer:
Alternative Delivery Systems (ADS). Generally, ADS have an arrangement in
which the insured pays a fixed fee and receives a health care package which com-
prehensively covers both office and hospital services. Id. at 774-75. ADS have
existed in the United States since the 1930s. Id. at 777-78. Nonetheless, the
American Medical Association (AMA) has been successful in keeping these plans
in the minority by voicing its fears that lack of physician autonomy results from
physicians occupying the positions of salaried employees in ADS. Id. at 21; see
also W. CURRAN, M. HALL & D. KAYE, HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 855 (1990).
In the 1980s, the balance began to swing in ADS's favor. This shift resulted
for several reasons: (1) the increase in the cost of medical care outpaced infla-
tion; (2) responding to increased costs, Blues plans either increased premiums
or began prospective payment plans (where reimbursement is based on what the
service should have cost as opposed to what was actually charged resulting in the
insured being responsible for the difference); and (3) federal legislative encour-
agement of ADS with the HMO Act of 1973 (42 U.S.C. § 300e-9 (1982)). AMER-
ICAN HEALTH LAW 21, 123-26, 215, 219-21, 780-81. Consequently, with ADS's
increasing popularity, Blues plans were forced to compete to maintain their mar-
ket share. See U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 917-18 (Blue Cross's advertising cam-
paign was launched in response to its declining market share). The growth in
competition between health insurers has occurred nationwide. AMERICAN
HEALTH LAW 781 (comparing 1981 national survey of large and mid-size em-
ployers showing workforce ADS enrollment of 4% with 1987 national survey of
employees showing ADS enrollment of 27%); see also DiNardo, If They Only Sing
the Blues, 8 BOSTON Bus. J., No. 38, § 1, at 1 (1988) (aggressive Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plan used comparative advertising to recapture its "sagging market
share"); Foran, Marketing Campaigns Blow in on Tail Winds of HMO Enrollment Sea-
son, 5 Bus. J. MILWAUKEE, No. 2, § 2, at 28 (1987) (competitive Blues plans and
HMO's vie in fall open-enrollment season); Holtzman, Blue Cross: Making a Come-
back?, 6 OCEAN ST. Bus., No. 26, § 1, at 14 (1989) (Rhode Island Blues respond
to HMO competition by introducing similar product); Tooher, Competing Plans
Viefor State Workers, 17 THE PROVIDENCEJ.-BULL., No. 141, § C, at 1 (1989) (com-
petition among Blues and HMOs intensifies because prize is largest health insur-
ance contract in state); Hawaii's Economy: Health Care-A $2.1 Billion Business and
Growing, Pacific Bus. News, Apr. 19, 1988, § 1, at 67 (health insurance is third
largest industry in state; competition is increasing among providers); Libov,
HM. s. : As Field Fills, Struggle Grows, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1987, § IlCN, at 1,
col. 1 (increased competition among health care insurance providers with mar-
ket saturation).
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care's increasingly popular Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) .13
The intensive advertising campaign Blue Cross launched to promote
Personal Choice became the basis of U.S. Healthcare's legal com-
plaint. 14 In addition to filing suit, U.S. Healthcare launched its own ad-
contracts with "preferred" providers, who agree to accept discounted
fees and to be subject to constraints against unnecessary utilization. If
a person insured by a PPO receives care from a "preferred" provider,
the insurance premium covers the full cost of care. If the insured
chooses to obtain care from a noncontracting provider, PPO coverage
functions as indemnity insurance that pays a portion of the medical bill.
AMERICAN HEALTH LAw 775.
13. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 918. "An HMO acts as both an insurer and
a provider of specified services that are more comprehensive than those offered
by traditional insurance." Id. at 917. HMOs provide a "defined package of in-
patient and outpatient services" for a fixed payment. AMERICAN HEALTH LAW,
supra note 12, at 774. An HMO cannot increase the insured's rate or refuse
treatment even if the policyholder uses more services than are covered by the
contract. Id.
14. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 919. Immediately after Blue Cross com-
menced its comparative advertising campaign, U.S. Healthcare filed suit in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas for defamation, commercial dis-
paragement and tortious interference with contract. Id. U.S. Healthcare then
re-filed its state claims along with a federal claim for unfair competition under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. Id. at 920.
Blue Cross's advertisements were comparative; its campaign was designed
to "reduce the attractiveness of [HMO]." Id. at 918. Blue Cross was losing sub-
scriptions at a rate greater than 1% per year since the inception of alternative
health insurance. Id. at 917. The Third Circuit recognized that a "large number
of those subscribers [chose] HMO coverage over traditional insurance, and a
majority of those defectors [chose] a U.S. Healthcare company." Id.
The advertisements at issue in U.S. Healthcare were designed for print, tele-
vision and radio. See id. at 918-20. The Third Circuit described the advertise-
ments in detail. See id. at 918-19. Most of Blue Cross's print advertisements
represented that an insured must select a primary care physician if they are cov-
ered by an HMO. Id. at 918. The ads also claimed that the primary care physi-
cian is required to give the insured permission to consult a specialist before the
HMO will provide coverage. Id. The court emphasized that three of the print
advertisements concluded with the caption:
You should also know that through a series of financial incentives,
HMO encourages this doctor to handle as many patients as possible
without referring to a specialist. When an HMO doctor does make a
specialist referral, it could take money directly out of his pocket. Make
too many referrals, and he could find himself in trouble with HMO.
Id.
The Third Circuit then examined Blue Cross's television advertisements.
All of these TV advertisements concluded with Blue Cross's slogan: "Personal
Choice. Better than HMO. So good, it's Blue Cross and Blue Shield." Id. The
court found that four of the seven TV advertisements were "innocuous." Id.
The court further examined three television commercials which featured respec-
tively: 1) "an indignant everyman" who complains, "I resent having to ask my
HMO doctor for permission to see a specialist"; 2) a cab driver who states "I
don't like those HMO health plans. You get one doctor, no choice of hospitals";
and 3) a "grief stricken woman" lamenting that "[t]he hospital my HMO sent me
to just wasn't enough. It's my fault." Id. at 918-19. The U.S. Healthcare court
described the third television commercial as a "dramatic departure from the
5
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vertising campaign that was designed to protect its HMO's new-found
market share. 15 U.S. Healthcare's comparative ads provided the foun-
dation of Blue Cross's countersuit. 16
The jury that tried the case initially failed to reach a verdict. 17 The
district court, therefore, declared a mistrial and then asked the jurors to
share their thoughts on the case for the benefit of the attorneys for the
parties. 18 Consequently, the court learned that the jurors were close to
unanimity in rejecting Blue Cross's counterclaims.' 9 Therefore, the dis-
others in that it appears consciously designed to play upon the fears of the con-
suming public." Id. at 919.
Finally, the Third Circuit examined Blue Cross's radio advertisements. The
court recognized that "[a]ll represent[ed] [not only] that HMO limits choice of
hospitals and physicians and requires plan permission to see a specialist, but that
Personal Choice provides unlimited choice of network hospitals and physicians
and affords unrestricted access to specialists." Id.
15. Id. at 919. The Third Circuit scrutinized U.S. Healthcare's commercials
along with Blue Cross's advertising campaign. Id. at 919-20. U.S. Healthcare
utilized multimedia advertisements which were designed to run in more than
one medium (print, radio and/or television). One of U.S. Healthcare's mul-
timedia advertisements was designed to show the extremes to which an HMO
will go in order to provide the best possible medical care for its members. The
ad featured a claim "that [a] girl, who required a unique wrist operation, was
sent to Baltimore to be operated on by 'the best [surgeon] in the country' rather
than one of HMO's fine surgeons." Id. at 919. Another U.S. Healthcare mul-
timedia advertisement featured a physician's explanation to an HMO member
that primary care physician referrals to specialists are necessary in order to help
patients determine what type of specialist is needed. Id. The Third Circuit
noted that neither multimedia ad mentioned Blue Cross. Id.
Three of U.S. Healthcare's print advertisements, however, did compare
Blue Cross's plan to its own product. Id. One of these comparative advertise-
ments displayed a list of HMO and Personal Choice features and included the
slogan, "It's your choice." Id. The two other U.S. Healthcare print advertise-
ments explained that under the Personal Choice plan, an insured does not have
unlimited hospital access. Id. These ads also represented that many Personal
Choice physicians do not even have admitting privileges at the few hospitals that
participate in the program. Id. The final two U.S. Healthcare advertisements
that the Third Circuit considered were run on television. Id. One of these TV
commercials portrayed a person thumbing through the Personal Choice Hospi-
tals and Physicians Directory and indicating "the 'gray area' of physicians with-
out admitting privileges." Id. at 919-20. The second TV ad featured a
distraught family standing by a hospital bed as solemn music played. Id. at 920.
A pair of hands pulled a sheet over the Personal Choice brochure laying on the
bed pillow as a narrator listed the faults of Personal Choice. Id. The Third Cir-
cuit characterized this final advertisement as "U.S. Healthcare's own attempt to
play upon the fears of the consuming public." Id.
16. Id. at 920. Like U.S. Healthcare, Blue Cross sued for damages alleging
violations of the Lanham Act, defamation, commercial disparagement and tor-
tious interference with contract. In addition, Blue Cross alleged abuse of pro-
cess and malicious use of process. Id.
17. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 920 ("After a fourteen-day trial, followed by
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trict court judge reconstituted the jury solely to determine whether Blue
Cross could recover on its counterclaims. 20 The jury returned a verdict
against Blue Cross on the counterclaims within ten minutes.2 1
Having lost on its counterclaims, Blue Cross then filed a motion
requesting the court to enter judgment in its favor on U.S. Healthcare's
claims.2 2 In support of its motion, Blue Cross contended that its ads
concerned matters of public concern and argued that U.S. Healthcare
could not recover on its claims without providing "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence that the ads were false and that Blue Cross acted with
actual malice.2 3 The district court agreed and entered judgment for
Blue Cross after finding that U.S. Healthcare had failed to produce the
required evidence of falsity and actual malice.2 4 This appeal followed.
III. DIscussIoN
The Third Circuit commenced its discussion in U.S. Healthcare with
a determination of whether the advertisements in question were actiona-
ble under the federal and state laws.2 5 After determining which adver-
20. Id.
21. Id. at 940.
22. Id. at 920.
23. Id. Finding in favor of Blue Cross on this motion, the district court
relied upon New York Times for its proposition that "the parties must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the other side publicized the advertisements
with actual malice-that is with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity."
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, No. 86-6452 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1988) (1988
WL 21830, *2). The district court opined that this heightened standard "would
resolve doubts in favor of speech when the truth of a statement is difficult to
ascertain conclusively." Id. (citation omitted).
24. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 920. The district court opined that U.S.
Healthcare did not appreciate the importance of the speech at issue in the suit
when it rejected U.S. Healthcare's contention that the speech was commercial
and, therefore, not entitled to New York Times's heightened scrutiny. U.S. Health-
care, No. 86-6452 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1988) (1988 WL 21830, *3). Judge Katz, the
trial court judge, reasoned that "[t]he dispute is about how best to deal with
spiraling medical costs.... This debate [in the advertisements in question] in-
volves 'the free flow of ideas on matters of public interest and concern,' which is
at the heart of the first amendment." Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
25. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 920-27. In order to sustain an action under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the Third Circuit requires:
1) that the defendant has made false or misleading statements as to his
own product [or another's]; 2) that there is actual deception or at least
a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience;
3) that the deception is material in that it is likely to influence purchas-
ing decisions; 4) that the advertised goods travelled in interstate com-
merce; and 5) that there is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms
of declining sales, loss of good will, etc.
Id. at 922-23 (quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics, Inc., 545 F. Supp.
165, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Pollak, J.)).
The U.S. Healthcare court also discussed the elements required in the state
law causes of action. Id. at 923-25. The court noted that, for defamation, Penn-
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tisements were actionable under which causes of action, 26 the court
sylvania requires the court to make a threshold determination as to whether the
statement at issue is capable of defamatory meaning. Id. at 923. Thejury must
then determine whether the statement was actually understood as defamatory by
the reader or listener. Id. The court also noted that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving: "1) the defamatory character of the communication; 2) its publica-
tion by the defendant; 3) its application to the plaintiff; 4) an understanding by
the reader or listener of its defamatory meaning; and 5) an understanding by the
reader or listener of an intent by the defendant that the statement refer to the
plaintiff." Id. at 923 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(a)(l)-(5) (1988)). Lastly,
the plaintiff must establish that "the statement results from fault, amounting at
least to negligence, on the part of the defendant." Id.
In order to evaluate the parties' commercial disparagement claims, the
Third Circuit first distinguished that cause of action from defamation. Id. at 924.
The court stressed that if a statement refers to the quality of a corporate party's
goods, commercial disparagement is the appropriate cause of action. Id. If,
however, the statement refers to the reputation or character of the corporation
as an individual, defamation is the appropriate action. Id. The court then stated
that in a commercial disparagement action, the plaintiff has the burden lof prov-
ing "1) that the disparaging statement of fact is untrue or that the disparaging
statement of opinion is incorrect; 2) that no privilege attaches to the sthtement;
and 3) that the plaintiff suffered a direct pecuniary loss as the result of the dis-
paragement." Id.
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed tortious interference with contract not-
ing that "one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely
causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with another, or (b) enter
into or continue a business relation with another is liable to the other for the
harm caused thereby." Id. at 924-25 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766
(1939)). Pennsylvania law distinguishes between existing contractual rights and
prospective contractual rights in applying this definition. Id. at 925.
26. Id. at 925-27. The U.S. Healthcare court recognized that all the asserted
causes of action did not apply to every challenged advertisement. Id. at 925.
Therefore, the court ruled as to which advertisements were actionable. The
court found that Blue Cross's television ads that simply identified Personal
Choice and featured the slogan "Better than HMO. So good, it's Blue Cross
and Blue Shield," were "the most innocuous kind of 'puffing,' common to adver-
tising [and] present(ed] no danger of misleading the consuming public." Id. at
926. Therefore, the court held that those three television advertisements were
not actionable. Id.
The Third Circuit examined the remaining commercials as a group accord-
ing to the cause of action alleged. Id. at 926-27. Addressing the federal claims
under the Lanham Act, the court decided that U.S. Healthcare's multimedia ad-
vertisements (one featuring a girl who received a wrist operation in Baltimore;
the other featuring a physician explaining HMO's referral policy) were only ac-
tionable for unfair competition. Id. The court opined that the advertisements
could only support an action for unfair competition-misrepresentation of its
own product-because the ads did not refer to Blue Cross. Id. The court also
found that two of Blue Cross's advertisements (a print ad that described Per-
sonal Choice's features without mention of HMO and a television ad that repre-
sented that Personal Choice covers "routine doctor visits, prescriptions, even
pediatric care") were only actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id.
The Third Circuit then examined the "bulk of advertisements, which either
compare[d] the competing health plans on one or more points, or simply criti-
cize[d] the competitor's health plan without detailed exposition of the adver-
tiser's own competing plan." Id. The court held that these advertisements were
actionable under the Lanham Act for misrepresentation of another's product.
Id. The court also held that the ads were actionable under state law for commer-
8
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addressed the central question of whether the first amendment alters the
requisite standard of proof in comparative advertising claims.2 7
Traditional first amendment speech analysis addresses both the na-
ture of the speech at issue and the status of the plaintiff in the case. In
its analysis of the appropriate standard of proof, the court first focused
on the characterization of the speech involved. U.S. Healthcare con-
tended that the advertisements in question were "commercial
speech."'2 8 Therefore, U.S. Healthcare would need only to prove that
the statements made by Blue Cross were false by a preponderance of the
evidence in order to sustain its substantive claims. 29 Blue Cross, on the
other hand, argued that the speech in its advertisements was only action-
able if U.S. Healthcare could prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Blue Cross had knowingly made false statements. Blue Cross pre-
mised its position on the contention that the parties to the lawsuit were
cial disparagement since they were representations concerning a competitor's
product and for tortious interference with contract "to the extent that these ad-
vertisements were unprivileged, were intended to interfere with existing or pro-
spective contractual relations and actually did [interfere] . I..." d. at 927.
Finally, the Third Circuit considered those advertisements that went beyond
a representation of the product itself and represented the corporation's charac-
ter to determine which ads supported defamation actions. Id. The court recog-
nized that some of Blue Cross's advertisements (those which "suggest HMO
primary care physicians have a financial interest in not referring patients to spe-
cialists and, indeed, that HMO makes reprisals against those primary care physi-
cians" and the "Distraught Woman" television spot in which a "grief-stricken
woman" says, "the hospital my HMO sent me to just wasn't enough") implied
despicable behavior on U.S. Healthcare's part. Id. at 926-27. Therefore, the
court held that these advertisements were actionable under a corporate defama-
tion theory. Id. Likewise, the court found that one U.S. Healthcare commercial
(a family grieving over a "deceased" Personal Choice brochure) imputed repre-
hensible conduct to corporate Blue Cross. Id. at 927. Additionally, the Third
Circuit found that this latter group of advertisements was actionable under the
Lanham Act and for tortious interference with contract. Id.
27. Id. at 927-39. "In what we believe is a matter of first impression, we are
presented with the unique circumstance of allegedly defamatory statements
made in the context of a comparative advertising campaign." Id. at 928. The
parties' arguments centered upon the characterization of the speech in question.
Id. at 927. As it was the first case to directly address first amendment issues in
comparative advertising, the appeal generated interest in both local and national
business communities. See Eisenberg, Is Advertising Entitled to First Amendment
Rights?, Focus, June 22, 1988, § 1, at 56; George, Appeals Court Revives U.S.
Healthcare's Suit, 9 PHILADELPHIA Bus. J., No. 2, § 1, at 1 (1990); Ham, U.S.
Healthcare Appeals Ruling on TV Ad Suit, 7 PHILADELPHIA Bus. J., No. 2, § 1, at 5
(1988); Healthcare Providers Spar, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 26, 1990, at 10; U.S.
Healthcare Seeks to Overturn District Judge's Ruling, PUBLIC RELATIONS NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 15, 1988.
28. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 927. For a discussion of the commercial
speech doctrine, see infra notes 32, 38-43 & 48-50 and accompanying text. For
a detailed discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see Comment, A Critical
Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 359 (1990).
29. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 921, 927 (U.S. Healthcare argued New York
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public figures and the issue of healthcare reimbursement was a public
concern. 30 In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit discussed the
background of first amendment jurisprudence 3 t and the development of
the commercial speech doctrine. 3 2 The resulting fusion of first amend-
30. Id. (Blue Cross argued New York Times standard does apply, and, there-
fore, clear and convincing evidence standard is appropriate).
The heightened burden of proof in first amendment defamation cases is
"clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). For a discussion of the first amendment
heightened evidentiary standard and the U.S. Healthcare court's rejection of Blue
Cross's argument, see infra notes 31, 41-44 & 50-56 and accompanying text.
31. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 927-30. The New York Times Court added
the actual malice requirement to the plaintiff's burden of proof in specified defa-
mation cases that implicated increased first amendment concerns. New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). After New York Times, the Court
has strived to " 'lay down broad rules of general application,' rather than to al-
low balancing between competing values on a case-by-case basis, an approach
that the Court fears would 'lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and . . .render [its] duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable.' "
U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 928 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 343-44 (1974)). Consequently, the New York Times rationale has been ex-
panded. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending
New York Times rationale to "public figures"); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46 (estab-
lishing distinction between private and public figures so that state is at liberty to
impose its own burden of proof with issues involving private plaintiffs and public
speech as long as fault is required); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (establishing distinc-
tion between speech of public and private concern; presumed and punitive
damages are recoverable without proof of actual malice if speech is private). For
a discussion of the New York Times actual malice requirement, see supra note 6
and accompanying text.
32. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 933-34 & n.23. Commercial speech was first
afforded constitutional protection in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Board of Pharmacy,
a consumer's group asserted that a Virginia statute that prohibited advertise-
ment of prescription drug prices violated the first and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 753-54. The Pharmacy Board argued that "the advertisement of prescrip-
tion drug prices is outside the protection of the First Amendment because it is
'commercial speech.'" Id. at 758. The Supreme Court, however, held that com-
mercial speech is constitutionally protected:
It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment
protection because money is spent to project it .... If there is a kind of
commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection . . .it
must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech whose content
deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial
subject.
Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
Over the years, the Court has developed tests to ease the application of the
commercial speech doctrine. The Court defined when a speaker who is re-
stricted by governmental regulation may be granted constitutional relief in Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557,
563-66 (1980). The Court stated first that the speech the speaker seeks to pro-
tect must be truthful and related to legal activity. Id. at 563-64. If the speech
satisfies those criteria, then the government may only restrict the speech if the
10
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ment speech analysis and the commercial speech doctrine will impact
the practice of law in the Third Circuit and perhaps throughout the
country. 33
At the outset, the Third Circuit noted that "it is of no consequence
that the defendants (and the counterclaim defendants) are not mem-
bers of the broadcast and print media."'3 4 The court also stated that it
was not limiting its consideration of the applicability of the New York
Times standard to the defamation claim. 35 The court then proceeded to
discuss the content of the speech at issue and to evaluate both the con-
cept of commercial speech and the historical distinction between speech
of public concern and speech of private concern.3 6
The United States Supreme Court has stated that commercial
speech, as a class of speech, is entitled to some level of first amendment
protection.3 7 Not all speech, however, is afforded the same level of first
amendment protection. 38 The U.S. Healthcare court defined commercial
regulation "directly advance[s]" a "substantial [governmental] interest" and is
"not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." Id. at 564, 566.
More recently, the Court set guidelines to distinguish between commercial
and non-commercial speech in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 66-67 (1983). Citing New York Times, the Court emphasized that whether the
speech is paid for as an advertisement is not determinative of whether the
speech is commercial. Id. at 66. Rather, whether the speech is in the form of a
paid advertisement is one factor indicating that the speech might be commercial.
Id. Other factors are: whether there is reference in the ad to a "specific prod-
uct" and whether the speaker was economically motivated in placing the ad. Id.
at 66-67. "The combination of all these characteristics ... provides strong sup-
port for the ... conclusion that the... [speech] is commercial speech." Id. at 67
(emphasis in original).
33. The comparative form is becoming the weapon of choice for advertis-
ers. See supra note 1.
34. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 930-31. For a discussion of the defendant's
characterization, see infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
35. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 931.
36. Id. The Third Circuit noted that traditional defamation analysis begins
with an examination of the plaintiff's status. Id. However, the court decided
first to address the content of the speech involved. Id. The court explained that
its "inverted analysis is [not] improper." Id. "We believe.., that the novel facts
here require a different approach. Our appraisal of these interests depends on
whether the speech at issue can properly be characterized as commercial
speech." Id.
37. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761-70 (1976). For a discussion of Virginia Board of Pharmacy, see supra note
32.
38. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 928. The United States Supreme Court has
distinguished types of speech by evaluating the first amendment protection that
they deserve:
This Court on many occasions has recognized that certain kinds of
speech are less central to the interests of the First Amendment than
others. [Obscene speech and "fighting words" have long been ac-
corded no protection.] In the area of protected speech, the most prom-
inent example of reduced protection for certain kinds of speech
concerns commercial speech. Such speech, we have noted, occupies a
1991]
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speech as an "expression related to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience, generally in the form of a commercial adver-
tisement for the sale of goods and services." '3 9 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp. ,40 the Supreme Court enunciated the following three fac-
"subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values." It is
also more easily verifiable and less likely to be deterred by proper regu-
lation. Accordingly, it may be regulated in ways that might be imper-
missible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
Id. at 932 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 758 n.5 (1985) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted)).
In U.S. Healthcare, Blue Cross argued that the application of the commercial
speech doctrine to the case at bar was inappropriate because the doctrine was
previously used only in government regulation cases, none of which involved a
defamation claim. See id. at 932, 933 n.23; see, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (state bar association regulation of attorney
advertisements); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (fed-
eral statutory ban of unsolicited ads for contraceptives through mail); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (Public
Service Commission ban on utility advertising for increased electricity consump-
tion); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (state statute characterizing advertisement of drug prices as unpro-
fessional conduct by pharmacists). However, the Third Circuit rejected Blue
Cross's argument and stated that it "believe[d] the subordinate valuation of
commercial speech is not confined to the government regulation line of cases."
U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 932.
The U.S. Healthcare court cited four reasons to support its conclusion that
commercial speech requires less first amendment protection than the New York
Times standard affords other types of speech concerning public figures. Id. at
933-34. First, the court noted that "commercial speech generally makes a differ-
ent contribution to the exposition of ideas." Id. at 933. The court's position
reflects the idea that "[t]he First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is
based on the informational function of advertising." Id. at 934 (quoting Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563). This concern for the informational function of adver-
tising is different than a concern for the dissemination of ideas relating to
"'matters of public concern' that [are] . . . 'at the heart of the First Amend-
ment's protection.'" Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (plurality opinion) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
Second, the Third Circuit noted that "commercial speech tends to be more
durable than other types of speech" because the speaker has "an economic self-
interest in dissemination." U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 934. Therefore, the
speech is less likely to be chilled by regulation. Id. Third, the U.S. Healthcare
court recognized that because "commercial speakers have extensive knowledge
of both their market and their own products .... they are uniquely situated to
evaluate the truthfulness of their speech." Id. Finally, the Third Circuit ex-
pressed a concern about dilution: "To require a parity of constitutional protec-
tion for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution,
simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment's guarantee
with respect to the latter kind of speech." Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
39. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 933 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
40. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). In Bolger, Youngs, a manufacturer of prophylactics,
desired to mail informational pamphlets to the public promoting the general use
of contraceptives, and in particular, Youngs' products. Id. at 62. A federal stat-
12
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tors to consider in evaluating whether speech is commercial: "(1) is the
speech an advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific product
or service; and (3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the
speech."
41
The Third Circuit held that U.S. Healthcare's and Blue Cross's ad-
vertisements constituted commercial speech. 42 In addition to the three-
factor analysis described above, the U.S. Healthcare court noted that the
speech in question was "durable, not susceptible to 'chill.' ",4s In fact,
the court "believe[d] [that] it would have to be a cold day before these
corporations would be chilled from speaking about the comparative
ute prohibited "the mailing of unsolicited ads for contraceptives." Id. at 61.
Youngs argued that this regulation should be subject to constitutional strict
scrutiny because it amounted to a content-based regulation of speech. Id. at 65.
Youngs maintained that the prohibition was content-based because the pam-
phlets addressed matters of public concern: unwanted pregnancy and sexually
transmitted disease. See id. at 62-63 & n.4. The government argued that the
speech was commercial and, therefore, subject to a lower level of scrutiny. See id.
at 66.
The Court applied the factors set out above to determine if the speech at
bar was commercial. Id. at 67-68. Because the material in the pamphlets satis-
fied all of the criteria, the Court held that it was commercial speech. Id. Accord-
ingly, the Court applied the Central Hudson test to determine whether the
statutory ban at issue passed constitutional muster. Id. at 68-75.
The regulation failed the Central Hudson test. Id. at 75. In asserting that the
ban furthered a substantial governmental interest, the government argued "that
the statute (1) shields recipients of mail from materials that they are likely to find
offensive and (2) aids parents' efforts to control the manner in which their chil-
dren become informed about sensitive and important subjects such as birth con-
trol." Id. at 71. Instead, the Court found that the regulation was paternalistic in
the first instance, and, secondly, that it "denie[d] to parents truthful information
bearing on their ability to discuss birth control and to make informed decisions
in this area." Id. at 71, 74.
41. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 933 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67). Af-
firmative responses to all three factors of the Bolger test are "strong support" for
the conclusion that the speech is commercial. Id. The Third Circuit's analysis of
the speech involved in U.S. Healthcare provided affirmative answers to all of the
Bolger factors: "[1)]there is no question that... [the commercials are] advertise-
ments; they were disseminated as part of an expensive, professionally run pro-
motional campaign; [2)] the speech specifically refers to a product, [and 3)] the
desire for revenue motivated the speech." Id. at 934.
42. Id. at 937.
43. Id. at 935. "Chill" is the behavioral reaction to regulated speech that
led the Supreme Court to establish the New York Times rule relating to speech
and public officials. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 863
(2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe notes that
a great danger of self-censorship arises from the fear of guessing
wrong-the fear that the trier of fact, proceeding by formal processes
of proof and refutation, will after the event reject the individual's judg-
ment of truth. This fear is exacerbated by the danger that a jury will
not fairly find the facts in cases involving unpopular speakers or unor-
thodox ideas. And there is simply the cost of litigating a defamation
suit ....
Id. at 863-64 (footnotes omitted).
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merits of their products." 44
The court then considered Blue Cross's assertion that the speech in
question was subject to heightened constitutional protection, despite its
commercial nature, because its subject matter was one of public con-
cern.4 5 Blue Cross argued that "speech which does more than 'simply
propose a commercial transaction' constitutes something more than
commercial speech."146 It maintained that its speech fell within this cate-
gory because its advertisements "educate[d] the public about the sub-
stantial differences among the[] available means for financing and
delivering health care .... -47
44. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 935.
45. Id. at 935-37. New York Times's progeny developed a framework for de-
termining the level of first amendment protection based upon the characteriza-
tion of the type of speech and the person who was allegedly defamed. These
cases reflect the Court's attempt to balance the state's interest in maintaining the
reputational rights of its citizens with the -federal constitutional interest in pre-
serving freedom of speech.
Ten years after New York Times, the Court noted, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
that private individuals are more vulnerable to injury from defamatory state-
ments than are public figures. 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974). Therefore, the
Court opined that states have a more substantial interest in protecting private
individuals from harm than public figures. Id. at 345-46. In order to provide
this extra protection to private persons, the Court held that "as long as they do
not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the ap-
propriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. at 347.
Over a decade later, the Court held that in defamation suits involving a
private plaintiff and matters of public concern, the plaintiff must prove that the
statements were false in order to recover damages. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). More recently, the Supreme Court
held that speech relating to private concerns that is directed against private per-
sons does not merit New York Times's heightened first amendment protection.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756-57 (1985)
(plurality opinion).
46. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936. Blue Cross relied upon Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), when it contended that its speech constituted more
than commercial speech. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936. In Bigelow, a New
York-based women's group advertised in a Virginia newspaper to assist and
counsel women seeking an abortion. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812-13. The advertise-
ment violated a Virginia statute that made encouraging the procurement of an
abortion a misdemeanor. Id. Ruling against the state, the Supreme Court re-
jected the "central assumption made by the Supreme Court of Virginia ... that
the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press are inapplicable to paid
commercial advertisements." Id. at 818. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the Virginia statute violated the first amendment because the speech at issue was
of "potential interest and value to a diverse audience" and because the Virginia
state legislature was powerless to regulate the advertiser's activity in New York.
Id. at 822-25.
47. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936. Blue Cross asserted that the Bigelow
standard applied to commercial advertising of all products that are "at the
center of public debate." Id. Drawing an analogy between the public concern
with the abortion issue and public concern with the financing and delivery of
healthcare, Blue Cross argued that New York Times's heightened evidentiary stan-
dard was applicable in the present case just as it was in Bigelow. See id.
14
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The Third Circuit, however, rejected Blue Cross's argument and
held that an advertiser cannot "immuniz[e] . . .otherwise defamatory
speech-behind the actual malice standard afforded to core speech by
the First Amendment-simply by reference to an issue of public con-
cern." 48 The court stressed that although medical payments and costs
are matters of public concern and debate, the speech in question none-
theless was commercial. 49 The court concluded:
48. Id. at 936. The Third Circuit relied on Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), in reaching its conclu-
sion. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936. The dispute in Central Hudson centered
around the New York Public Service Commission's ban on electric utilities' ad-
vertisements that "promot[ed] the use of electricity." 447 U.S. at 558. The
Commission instituted the ban on the belief that energy would be conserved if
consumption was not encouraged. Id. at 559. The utilities maintained, how-
ever, that their advertisements were closely related to the policy of national en-
ergy conservation, and, therefore, deserved heightened first amendment
protection. Id. at 562-63, n.5.
The Central Hudson Court expressly rejected the utilities' contention that all
commercial speech related to issues "frequently discussed and debated by our
political leaders" merits the full panoply of first amendment protection. Id.
(quoting Stevens, J., concurring). The majority opined that such an approach
would "blur further the line the Court has sought to draw in commercial speech
cases. It would grant broad constitutional protection to any advertising that
links a product to a current public debate." Id. (emphasis added). The U.S.
Healthcare court followed Central Hudson's rationale when it stated that "[t]here is
no reason for providing full] constitutional protection when such statements are made only in
the context of commercial transactions." U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936 (quoting Cen-
tral Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5) (emphasis added by U.S. Healthcare court).
49. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936-37. The U.S. Healthcare court did not
rely solely on Central Hudson. It also relied on Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936-37. Bolger involved a
challenge to a government ordinance that prohibited mailing of unsolicited ma-
terial that pertained to contraception. 463 U.S. at 61. In its decision, the
Supreme Court reiterated the principle that "advertising which 'links a product
to a current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protec-
tion afforded noncommercial speech." Id. at 68 (quoting Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 563 n.5). It is important to note that the Bolger Court protected the com-
mercial speech in question not because the speech necessarily required height-
ened constitutional protection, but rather, because the government did not offer
sufficient justification for its regulation. Id. at 75.
The Third Circuit also cited Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626 (1985). U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 937. In Zauderer, an attorney ap-
pealed from a decision by the Ohio Supreme Court which affirmed a reprimand
for his deceptive advertising rendered by the court's disciplinary arm. Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 629-36. The Supreme Court addressed Zauderer's claim that his
first amendment rights had been violated:
There is no longer any room to doubt that what has come to be known
as "commercial speech" is entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment, albeit protection somewhat less extensive than that af-
forded "noncommercial speech." More subject to doubt, perhaps, are
the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed
commercial speech, but it is clear enough that the speech at issue in this
case-advertising pure and simple-falls within those bounds.
Id. at 637 (citations omitted). The Third Circuit stressed that the Zauderer Court
recognized that the speech in question may have been entitled to heightened
15
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[W]hile the speech here is protected by the First Amendment,
we hold that the First Amendment requires no higher standard
of liability than that mandated by the substantive law for each
claim. The heightened protection of the actual malice standard
is not "necessary to give adequate 'breathing space' to the free-
doms protected by the First Amendment."
50
Although the nature of the speech was relevant, it was not disposi-
tive in the Third Circuit's determination of the proper legal standards
applicable to the speech at issue in U.S. Healthcare.5 1 Consequently, the
court next evaluated the parties' status recognizing that "the state has
only a 'limited' interest in compensating public persons for injury to
reputation but has a 'strong and legitimate' interest in compensating
private persons for the same injury." 5 2
Blue Cross maintained that U.S. Healthcare was a public figure. 5 3
After discussing the various classes of public figures, the Third Circuit
determined that the only class into which U.S. Healthcare could possibly
first amendment protection "in another context," that is, non-commercial use. U.S.
Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 937 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 n.7 (emphasis
added)).
50. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 937 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
51. See id. at 931. Defamation analysis is based on a balancing of the gov-
ernmental interest in protecting the reputation of individuals and the interest of
freedom of expression protected by the first amendment. Id. at 930. Because
the public or private nature of the individual and the public or private nature of
the speech are each independent factors either of which could tip the balancing
scale, it follows that resolution of one of these issues cannot dispose of the case.
52. Id. at 937. The Supreme Court explained its reasons for attributing
different degrees of state interest according to the parties' status in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the Court explained that the
characterization of a defamation action lies not with the defendant but with the
plaintiff. Id. at 343. The Court concluded that "the state interest in compensat-
ing injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule
should obtain with respect to them." Id. at 343.
The Gertz Court cited two reasons for the difference in first amendment pro-
tection accorded to public and private persons. First, the Court found that pub-
lic figure plaintiffs have a better ability to use the media to refute the defamatory
charge. Id. at 344. On the other hand, private plaintiffs are "more vulnerable to
injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater." Id.
Second, the Gertz Court recognized that public figures voluntarily place them-
selves in the public eye creating a lesser expectation in reputational privacy. Id.
at 344-45. Private plaintiffs, however, do not "voluntarily expose[] [themselves]
to [an] increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood .... " Id. at 345.
Therefore, greater latitude is given to the state in order to protect private
individuals.
53. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 937-38. Whether a plaintiff is a public or a
private figure is determined as a matter of law. Id. at 938. Although the court
makes this threshold determination, it is subject to "careful" scrutiny by the ap-
pellate court. Id. For a detailed discussion of whether corporations qualify as
public figures in defamation actions, see Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff
as First Amendment "Public Figure"." Nailing theJellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35 (1982).
962 [Vol. 36: p. 947
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fall was that of a "limited purpose public figure."' 54 The court enumer-
ated two factors to consider when determining whether a plaintiff is a
limited purpose public figure: 1) whether the party has sufficient access
to the media, and 2) the "manner in which the risk of defamation came
upon [the party]." '5 5 The court evaluated these factors with respect to
both U.S. Healthcare and Blue Cross. The court noted that both parties
have significant media access which was illustrated by the fact that each
party used the media for its own benefit in its comparative advertising
campaign. 56 Additionally, the court recognized that both parties had
voluntarily entered the public discussion of healthcare delivery and re-
imbursement because they generated the campaigns at issue. 5 7
Notwithstanding these determinations, the U.S. Healthcare court de-
clined to characterize the parties as limited purpose public figures stat-
ing that, "[a]lthough some of the advertisements touch on matters of
public concern, their central thrust is commercial. Thus, the parties
have acted primarily to generate revenue by influencing customers, not
to resolve 'the issues involved.' "58 The court also noted that if access
54. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 938. The U.S. Healthcare court identified the
three classes of public figures developed in Gertz: "those who achieve such stat-
ure or notoriety that they are considered public figures in all contexts; those who
become public figures involuntarily; ...and those who are deemed public
figures only within the context of a particular public dispute." Id. Limited pur-
pose public figures are "individuals who voluntarily 'thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved.'" Id. (quoting Gertz 418 U.S. at 345 (1974)).
55. Id.
56. Id. The U.S. Healthcare court was quick to point out, however, that me-
dia access alone does not qualify one as a public figure. Id. In a footnote, the
court discussed Mary Alice Firestone who held press conferences during her
much publicized divorce. Id. at 938 n.28. The court noted that there was "no
indication that... [Mary Alice Firestone] sought to use the press conference as a
vehicle by which to thrust herself into the forefront of some unrelated contro-
versy in order to influence its resolution." Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 454 n.3 (1976) (citation omitted)).
57. Id. "Both companies, attempting to influence consumers' decisions,
have thrust themselves into the controversy of who provides better value in
health care delivery and insurance .... Consequently, by inviting comment and
assuming the risk of unfair comment, both claimants resemble public figures." Id.
(emphasis added).
58. Id. at 939. The U.S. Healthcare court reached its conclusion that the par-
ties were not limited purpose public figures despite the fact that the court was
faced with conflicting case law within the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit had
previously characterized a corporation that possessed attributes similar to those
possessed by Blue Cross and U.S. Healthcare as a limited purpose public figure.
See Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 274 n.47 (3d Cir. 1980).
In Steaks, a corporation that was conducting a "steak sale" instituted a defa-
mation action against a consumer news reporter and a television station. Id. at
266-68. The speech in question was a news report that maintained that the
plaintiff's meat was of a lower quality than the seller had represented in its ad-
vertising. Id. The report also contended that the plaintiffs misrepresented their
product's price. Id. The district court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment reasoning that Steaks was a public figure and had not met its
1991] 963
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to media and voluntary entry into public debate automatically qualify a
corporation as a public figure, "speech of public concern that implicates
corporate advertisers-i.e., typical comparative advertising-will always
be insulated behind the actual malice standard." '59 The Third Circuit
found that a blanket protection of comparative advertising was unac-
ceptable. 60 Therefore, the court rejected Blue Cross's argument that
public figure analysis was applicable to the case. 6 1 Accordingly, the
standard of proof applied to the parties' state and federal claims was the
standard commonly accepted in civil trials-a preponderance of the
evidence.6 2
burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendants had
acted with knowledge or with reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 269.
The Third Circuit relied on the Gertz definitions of a public figure and con-
cluded that Steaks was a limited purpose public figure. Id. at 272-74. The court
noted that "Steaks voluntarily injected itself into a matter of public interest...
for the purpose of influencing the consuming public. In short, through its ad-
vertising blitz, Steaks invited public attention, &mment, and criticism." Id. at
274. The Third Circuit also found that the fact that Steaks had "regular and
continuing access to the channels of communication" supported its conclusion
that Steaks was a limited purpose public figure. Id. The court noted that
"[u]nder these circumstances, Steaks does not have as compelling a claim for
judicial relief as it might, had it not possessed alternative means of challenging
the defendants' allegations." Id.
The U.S. Healthcare court distinguished Steaks: "Steaks does not control our
decision here ... [because] Steaks involved a consumer reporter's statement, not
a comparative advertising campaign." U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939 n.29.
The U.S. Healthcare court also distinguished Steaks by noting that the parties in
Steaks had conceded that the speech in question was of public concern. Id. The
court stated that " '[riegardless whether particular statements made by con-
sumer reporters are precisely accurate, it is necessary to insulate them from the
vicissitudes of ordinary civil litigation in order to foster . . .First Amendment
goals . . . .' Clearly, the statements in Steaks did not constitute commercial
speech." Id. (quoting Steaks, 623 F.2d at 280).
59. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit's
discussion of insulating comparative advertisements behind the actual malice
standard reflects its concern about dilution of first amendment protection. For a
discussion of dilution of first amendment protection, see supra note 38.
60. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939.
61. Id. The Third Circuit noted: "Most products can be linked to a public
issue. And most advertisers seek out the media." Id.
62. Id. Additionally, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether it is
proper for a court to reconstitute a jury after it has declared a mistrial and dis-
cussed the case with the jurors in open court. Id. at 939-40.
The U.S. Healthcare jury deliberated for eight days without reaching a ver-
dict. Id. at 940. During that time, the jurors sent four messages to the court
stating that they were deadlocked. Id. When the jury sent its fourth note, the
district court finally declared a mistrial; it then asked the jurors to discuss their
thoughts about the case for the benefit of the attorneys. Id. The discussion re-
vealed that the jurors were close to unanimity on the issue of "interrogatory
lB," Blue Cross's counterclaim. Id. The district court then vacated its declara-
tion of a mistrial and reconstituted the jury in order to reach a verdict on Inter-
rogatory lB. Id. Within ten minutes, the jury returned its verdict against Blue
Cross. Id.
The Third Circuit held that the "jury was improperly reconstituted." Id.
964 [Vol. 36: p. 947
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In U.S. Healthcare, the Third Circuit's analysis reflects a thoughtful
consideration and resolution of the legal, equitable and practical impli-
cations of the conflicting issues of commercial speech and first amend-
ment defamation analysis. The well-crafted opinion resolves a complex
problem that had no apparent "right" legal conclusion grounded in
precedent.
The U.S. Healthcare court addressed and synthesized the direct con-
flict between commercial speech and first amendment defamation analy-
sis.6 3 The commercial speech doctrine had previously been applied
only in those cases involving governmental regulation of speech.6 4 The
doctrine's primary focus was the motivation behind the speech and the
government's interest in regulating it.6 5 Traditional first amendment
analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the nature of the speech at issue
and the status of the plaintiff.
66
The Third Circuit recognized that if traditional first amendment
analysis was applied, virtually every corporation would be classified as a
limited purpose public figure.6 7 Likewise, the application of a public
concern test to the nature of the speech would sweep a broad path in the
advertising industry.6 8 Consequently, a strict following of the public fig-
ure and public concern tests would insulate corporate commercial
Significant to the court was the fact that the district court had declared a mistrial
and invited the jury to speak about the case before the jury was reconstituted.
Id. The court noted that "the jurors' responses made clear that no consensus
had ever been reached on any of the interrogatories." Id. at 941. The Third
Circuit also noted that it was improper for the district court to ask the jurors how
they were divided, stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned against ask-
ing a deadlocked jury how it is divided: 'We deem it essential to the fair and
impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded as
ground for reversal .... [I]n general its tendency is coercive.' " Id. (citing Bras-
field v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926)). The Third Circuit reinstated
Blue Cross's counterclaims because of the district court's procedural infirmities.
Id.
63. Id. at 928. The Third Circuit recognized that there were no cases deal-
ing with the situation where one corporate party claims that the New York Times's
heightened evidentiary standard is applicable while the other corporate party
claims that the speech in question is commercial and, therefore, requires the
lower common law evidentiary standard. Id.
64. Id. at 932. For a discussion of the commercial speech doctrine and its
application, see supra notes 30, 35-40 & 46-48.
65. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (Bolger
test focuses on speaker motivation as factor to determine whether speech is
commercial); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 561, 564-66 (1980) (requires government regulation to directly ad-
vance substantial state interest and to be narrowly drawn in order to constitu-
tionally regulate commercial speech).
66. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 931.
67. Id. at 939.
68. Id. at 936. The Third Circuit noted that "many, if not most, products
may be tied to public concerns with the environment, energy, economic policy,
1991] 965
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speakers from liability with the shield of the first amendment. Such an
extension of first amendment protection would dilute the analytical
structure on which the first amendment rests. 69
The Third Circuit rejected the technically "correct" conclusions
that the parties were limited purpose public figures and that the speech
at issue was of public concern and, instead, demonstrated its sympathy
for equitable and practical considerations. Equitably, the court recog-
nized that it is unfair to permit a business to damage its competitor with
defamatory or disparaging comparative advertising and allow it to es-
cape tort liability. Reason demands that if a corporation is capable of
being defamed, 70 the tortfeasor should not avoid liability merely be-
cause the defamatory speech can be characterized as speech of public
concern.
7 1
Practically, the Third Circuit acknowledged that there is little en-
hancement of public debate where competitors represent each other's
products without verifying their representations.7 2 Had the Third Cir-
or individual health and safety." Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5)
(emphasis added by U.S. Healthcare court).
69. See id. at 939. For a discussion of dilution, see supra note 38.
70. The Restatement of Torts permits corporations to bring defamation ac-
tions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 (1977). Section 561 provides
that
[olne who publishes defamatory matter concerning a corporate is sub-
ject to liability to it
(a) if the corporation is one for profit, and the matter tends to
prejudice it in the conduct of its business or to deter others from deal-
ing with it, or
(b) if, although not for profit, it depends upon financial support
from the public, and the matter tends to interfere with its activities by
prejudicing it in public estimation.
Id.
71. The first amendment was not intended to emasculate speech-related
torts. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, § 12-12, at 861. Professor Tribe notes that
[a]lthough its impact is felt on reputation rather than on bodily integ-
rity, libelous speech was long regarded as a form of personal assault,
and it was accordingly assumed that government could vindicate the
individual's right to enjoyment of his good name, no less than his bod-
ily integrity, without running afoul of the Constitution.
Id.
72. As one commentator has stated, "[w]here reason stops, so does the
rule." K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 151 (1950). Professor Tribe asserts
that there is little reason to apply the first amendment heightened scrutiny to
commercial speech. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, § 12-15, at 894-95. Professor Tribe
maintains that "[t]he 'greater objectivity' with which falsity may be identified in
most commercial contexts, and the correspondingly reduced danger of ideologi-
cal censorship in the guise of consumer protection, also support broader power
to suppress false advertising than to censor false or misleading speech gener-
ally." Id. (footnotes omitted).
In his concurring opinion in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, Justice Stewart rec-
ognized that commercial speech is valuable to society for the "facts" it relates,
while doctrinal expression "is integrally related to the exposition of thought-
thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man." Virginia
966 [Vol. 36: p. 947
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/9
1991] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 967
cuit held that Blue Cross and U.S. Healthcare were public figures, and,
therefore, their advertisements were protected by the first amendment,
all comparative advertisers would be justified in demanding the same
protection. Such an extension would be unfortunate. While it is prob-
able that the average consumer thoroughly investigates a health insur-
ance product, it is doubtful that the same consumer will investigate
the veracity of every advertisement he encounters. 73 The U.S. Healthcare
court's decision to hold corporations to a higher standard of care in
their advertising campaigns reflects a concern about consumer
protection.
The Third Circuit interpreted previous caselaw consistently with its
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Central Hudson, the Court found that
"[c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker,
but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possi-
ble dissemination of information." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) (emphasis added). Consequently, if
the only benefit of commercial speech is its informational value, it is illogical to
apply the same heightened scrutiny to it as that which applies to political speech.
More recently, in Bolger, the Court reiterated this position:
A company has the fully panoply of protections available to its direct
comments on public issues, so there is not reason for providing similar
constitutional protection when such statements are made in the context
of commercial transactions. Advertisers should not be permitted to im-
munize false or misleading product information from government reg-
ulation simply by including references to public issues.
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (footnote and cita-
tions omitted).
In an ideological context, there are no absolute facts--only opinions and
hypotheses exist. Therefore, it is essential to allow some "breathing space" for
the development of ideas and their free exchange. However, when language is
used merely as a conduit for the flow of factual information this "breathing
space" becomes unnecessary because there is no gray area of uncertainty that
must be protected in order to ensure effective communication.
73. It is logical and safe to assume that consumers investigate major
purchases. Even though manufacturers of highly priced items use comparative
advertisements in order to educate consumers, the primary purpose of their
campaign is to sell the high-priced product. One example of highly priced
goods that are marketed by using comparative advertising campaigns about
which many television-watching consumers would be aware is the comparative
battle between Ford and Chevrolet pick-up trucks.
The premise of investigation, however, may breakdown as the significance
of the advertized item decreases. For example, it is difficult to imagine the aver-
age consumer seriously pondering his next pizza purchase after viewing Pizza
Hut's comparative advertisements. A logical extension of Blue Cross's argu-
ment, however, would make all advertising public concern regardless of the
value of the information contained within the ad, and therefore, entitle it to
heightened first amendment protection. Just as equating consumer thoughtful-
ness in pizza and truck consumption appears inconsistent, blanket public con-
cern protection of all commercial speech would be vague and unworkable in the
long run. Had the Third Circuit concluded that commercial advertising was sub-
ject to heightened protection, attorneys within the jurisdiction would be forced
to push their clients' products down a slippery slope by arguing that the compar-
ative differences in beer, sneakers and fast food are of public concern.
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eventual holding. Since a strict interpretation of commercial speech and
defamation precedent would have led to an unworkable result, however,
the Third Circuit's synthesized those precedents to achieve a practical
result without actually violating precedent.
Notwithstanding the superior judicial analysis of U.S. Healthcare,
there is one inconsistency in the Third Circuit's opinion that should be
highlighted. At the outset of its opinion, the court emphasized that it
was irrelevant that neither party was a media/press defendant.7 4 How-
ever, the court later distinguished a similar Third Circuit case, Steaks Un-
limited, Inc. v. Deaner,75 on the grounds that a corporate party could be
considered a limited purpose public figure when the allegedly defama-
tory statements are made by a consumer news reporter.76
The Steaks court did raise the issue of whether the speech in ques-
tion was of public concern. 77 Nonetheless, the court, following Penn-
sylvania practice, glossed over the issue and followed United States
Supreme Court practice 7 8 preferring to determine whether the corpo-
rate plaintiff was a public figure. 79 In evaluating whether Steaks, Inc.
74. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 930-31.
75. 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
analysis in Steaks, see supra note 58.
76. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 938-39 n.29.
77. Steaks, 623 F.2d at 271.
78. Id. The Steaks court, discussing Pennsylvania's malice requirement for
defamation actions, brought up the issue of whether the television station's com-
mentary on the quality of Steak's meat was of public concern. Id. The Third
Circuit noted that a defense to the Pennsylvania presumption of malice is "that
the published material furthered 'some interest of social importance, which is
entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plain-
tiff's reputation.'" Id. (quoting Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432,
451, 273 A.2d 899, 909 (1971)). Nonetheless, the issue of whether the speech in
Steaks was of public concern was not decided.
Instead, the Third Circuit followed the Pennsylvania practice:
In determining whether public policy would be served by denying a
libel plaintiff recovery, Pennsylvania courts have tended to look for gui-
dance to the First Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. In this regard, the Pennsylvania cases do not distinguish pre-
cisely between the common law basis for recovery and the limitations
placed on such tort claims by the First Amendment.
Id.
79. Id. at 272-74. A plaintiff who is characterized as a public figure has the
burden of proving actual malice and falsity of the defamatory statement. Phila-
delphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (summarizing con-
stitutional aspects of defamation).
The Steaks court first analyzed whether Steaks was a public figure because its
resolution of that issue, that Steaks was a public figure, allowed the court to
avoid deciding-absent Pennsylvania court guidance-the standard of liability
for suits brought by private plaintiffs. Steaks, 623 F.2d at 272. Pennsylvania had
not yet responded to the Supreme Court's holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974), in which the Court held that where the speech is
of public concern but the plaintiff is a private figure, the state may impose its
own burden of proof provided that it does not impose liability without fault.
Steaks, 623 F.2d at 272. Consequently, the Steaks court reasoned:
968
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was a public figure, the Third Circuit applied the Gertz criteria, just as it
later did in U.S. Healthcare.80 The limited purpose public figure analysis
revealed that Steaks, Inc. had many of the same characteristics as the
parties in U.S. Healthcare.8 1 Despite their similarities, the Third Circuit
characterized Steaks, Inc. as a public figure, while it characterized Blue
Cross and U.S. Healthcare as private figures.
8 2
This author suggests that Steaks and U.S. Healthcare are distinguish-
able in that the defendant in Steaks was a member of the press media
while the defendants in U.S. Healthcare were private corporations. Sig-
nificantly the Third Circuit characterized the speech in U.S. Healthcare as
commercial. 8 3 If, however, the Third Circuit is faced with a fact situa-
[B]ecause we conclude that Steaks is a public figure[,] . . . regardless
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find significant the fact
that the broadcast here concerned matters of public or general con-
cern, Steaks is required by well-settled constitutional principles to
prove, with convincing clarity, that the defendants broadcast false state-
ments, knowing of their falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth.
Id.
80. Steaks, 623 F.2 at 272-74. The Third Circuit first concluded that Steaks
was neither an all-purpose public figure nor a private figure. Id. at 273. Conse-
quently, the Steaks court looked at the plaintiff to determine if it was a limited
purpose public figure in light of two Gertz criteria: 1) whether Steaks had "regu-
lar and continu[ed] access to the media"; and 2) whether Steaks "assumed the
risk of potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena and engaging
the public's attention." Id.
Citing Steaks' "intensive [advertising] campaign," its extensive advertising
costs ($16,000.00), and the consumer complaints to "both WTAE-TV and the
Bureau of Consumer Affairs," the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
termination that Steaks had thrust itself into the center of a public controversy.
Id. at 274. Additionally, the Steaks court noted Steaks' "regular and continuing
access to the channels of communication," with which it "could have purchased
additional advertising in order to respond to or seek to refute Deaner's
charges." Id.
81. The U.S. Healthcare court noted that "[u]nder traditional defamation
analysis, [U.S. Healthcare's and Blue Cross'] considerable access to the media
and their voluntary entry into a controversy are strong indicia that they are lim-
ited purpose public figures. Indeed, inflexible application of these factors would
warrant a finding of public figure status .... " U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 938-
39 (footnote omitted). As discussed supra note 80, it was the satisfaction of pre-
cisely these criteria that warranted limited purpose public figure status for the
plaintiff in Steaks. Steaks, 623 F.2d at 272-74.
82. Steaks, 623 F.2d at 272; U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939. The U.S.
Healthcare court determined that the speech at issue in Steaks was not commercial
at all. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939 n.4. The U.S. Healthcare court appears to
have based this determination on the fact that the statements at issue in Steaks
were made in the context of a consumer news report, and its conclusion that the
parties in Steaks had conceded that the speech was of public concern. Id.
Therein lies the rub. On the one hand, the U.S. Healthcare court stated that
whether a defendant is a member of the press media is irrelevant. Id. at 930-31.
On the other hand, the U.S. Healthcare court distinguished a similar case in its
own circuit because the defendant was a consumer news reporter. Id. at 939 n.4.
83. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 935. For a discussion of the commercial
speech doctrine and its application in U.S. Healthcare, see supra notes 32 & 38 and
accompanying text.
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tion analogous to Steaks, where the speech at issue was made by a media
defendant, it would follow the Steaks characterization of corporate adver-
tisers as public figures. The reasoning would be that a topic that the
media would cover as news would be raised to the level of public con-
cern by virtue of the media attention. Therefore, attorneys in the Third
Circuit who handle corporate defamation actions involving media de-
fendants should be aware that an argument exists that heightened first
amendment protections would apply. It should be noted, however, that
the U.S. Healthcare court did state that the defendant's status is
irrelevant.8 4
The U.S. Healthcare decision was also significant for a number of
other reasons. It illustrated that Third Circuit attorneys who litigate
corporate defamation, commercial disparagement, tortious interference
with contract or Lanham Act claims must evaluate whether either party
has a valid claim under any of these causes of action. Except for a claim
under the federal Lanhan Act, these attorneys will be required to evalu-
ate the common law claims using the law of the state in which the suit
is filed.8 5 The U.S. Healthcare court also established valuable guidelines
for determining whether the speech at issue in a particular case is char-
acterized as commercial. By adopting the Bolger test, the court set con-
crete, workable parameters for determining whether the speech is
commercial.8 6
Finally, the U.S. Healthcare court intimated that, in some circum-
stances, corporate speech may qualify for analysis under the New York
Times standard. 8 7 The court noted that the analysis of speech of public
concern would be different if the corporation "address[ed] an issue of
public concern involving a competitor, but [did] so with speech that is
neither commercial nor chill resistant."8 8 Further, the Third Circuit
84. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 930-3 1. "At the outset, we note that it is of
no consequence that the defendants (and counterclaim defendants) here are not
members of the broadcast and print media." Id.
85. See id. at 923. It is significant that the U.S. Healthcare court set bounda-
ries regarding which causes of action could apply to the various advertisements
in question at the outset of its opinion. Id. at 925-27. For a discussion of action-
able construction of the advertisements, see supra note 25.
86. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 933. The Bolger test asks: "(1) is the speech
an advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific product or service; and
(3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the speech." Id. at 933
(quoting, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983)). It is
important to note, however, that the Third Circuit followed Bolger strictly noting
that positive answers to all of these questions does not conclusively establish
that the speech in question is commercial. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 933. Af-
firmative responses are merely strongly supportive of that conclusion. Id.
87. See U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 935, 939.
88. Id. at 935. The Third Circuit recognized that a corporation "has the
full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public issues, so
there is no reason for providing similar protection when such statements are
made in the context of commercial transactions." Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)) (footnote omitted).
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noted that a primary consideration in the Gertz public figure analysis was
whether plaintiffs "thrust [themselves] to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved."' 89 Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that the adver-
tisements in U.S. Healthcare focused on an issue of public concern, the
court did not characterize U.S. Healthcare or Blue Cross as public
figures because the parties' primary goal in "thrusting [themselves] to
the forefront" of healthcare payment was "primarily to generate reve-
nue ... not to resolve 'the issues involved.' "90 Finally, the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion reveals, however, that it is possible for a financially
disinterested corporate party to speak in the public interest and, still
receive the protection of the heightened first amendment evidentiary
standard if forced to defend its speech in court.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Healthcare decision will not go unnoticed. It is the first
definitive opinion that deals with the rights and responsibilities of cor-
porate, commercial parties that engage in comparative advertising. The
Third Circuit's willingness to fashion new law instead of forcing incon-
gruous facts into precedent should be commended. The U.S. Healthcare
opinion will make the practice of commercial law in the Third Circuit
more definitive and precise. 9 1
Sheila McVey Mangan
89. Id. at 939 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 333, 345
(1974)).
90. Id.
91. It is noteworthy that the parties settled the case after the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in October, 1990. Newswatch, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 8,
1990, at 12. Blue Cross agreed to pay U.S. Healthcare $2 million to settle the
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